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REPT 7 BRIEF OF PETITIONER AUSTIN 
ARGUMENT 
!• liATE_Vi^JEYES, MAY APPLY RETROACTIVELY BUT NOT IN THE 
INSTANT MATTER 
In the BriefofResponde.nl ihc Stun- .lrpur: lha< HM- rase of State v. Reves. 2005 UT 
33, 116 P.3d 305, should be applied retroactively to the instant matter and that State 
preservation rules apply. ;/ of Respondent-atr ^ 
A. Retroactive 
"Exceptional circumstances are explained as "those which would explain and excuse 
a party's failure to raise a claimed error in the trial court." State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65 (Utah 
Vl ! W i !li> exception;*! »<icumstancc* uiikifil w:> ,r, n saleh di-viu in assure 
that manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider m i^suc on rippe.il." State 
v. Archambeau 820 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah App. 1991). 
Unlike "plain error," "exceptional circumstances" is not so much a precise 
doctrine, which may be analyzed in terms of fixed elements, as it is a 
descriptive term used to memorialize an appellate court's judgment that even 
though an issue was not raised below and even though the plain error doctrine 
does not apply, unique procedural circumstances nonetheless permit 
consideration of the merits of the issue on appeal. 
State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). In State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, (Utah 19941 
this Court employed the "exceptional circumstances" rubric where a change in law or the 
settled interpretation of law colored the failure to have raised an issue at trial. 
The Petitioner concedes that retroactivity may apply with regards to the decision of 
this Court in Reyes regarding the reasonable doubt jury instruction under the analysis of the 
State, However, retroactivity does not apply to the instant matter because Austin's trial was 
held prior to the change in the law and his appeal followed that change in the law. These 
types of circumstances require application of the exceptional circumstances rubric. 
The issue of retroactivity is not properly before this Court and therefore, this Court 
need not address it. Austin did not raise the issue in his petition and the State has not filed 
a cross-petition arguing retroactivity. Therefore, retroactivity does not need to be addressed 
by this Court. Such a determination of retroactivity could potentially open the flood gates 
for anyone who had previously followed Robertson from 1997 to 2005 to file petitions under 
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act for relief. Although retroactivity may apply to those who 
had exhausted all of their appeals prior to the decision in Reves. retroactivity does not apply 
to Austin or those who had their trial prior to the decision in Reyes and then filed their 
appeals subsequent to the decision therein because those appeals where not yet exhausted at 
2 
the time of the decision. This is a matter where the exceptional circumstances rubric clearly 
applies, 
B. Retroactivity Does Not Require Preservation but Rather is an Exception 
to the Rule 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-35a-104(2), which is contained in the Post-Convictions 
Mi "Hied \ Aol. (lis iiissestheidMiut In illh. mlc In IK iiii I 11 ill nl'inii ml JLild illlwl 'I ill In, question 
of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule announced by the United States 
Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or I Jtah Cour I: of ..Appeals after the petitioner's 
conviction became final shall be governed ;- applicable state and federal principles of 
retroactivity." Relief ii(? specifically excluded under the Po^M^nviction^ Wrmcdv Act, 
however, as follows: 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-
conviction relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a 
previous request for post-conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-
35a-107. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-35a-106. Therefore, the retroactivity rule as dictated in §78-35a-104(2), 
regarding a change in the law is clearly is reserved for those(a) who had the change of law 
occur after their conviction; (b) who could not raise the issue on direct appeal; and (c) whose 
conviction is final 
In Griffith v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court specifically addressed the 
State's argument regarding whether a change in law occurring between an individual's trial 
and appeal should be entertained by the trial courts or not, as follows: 
In Justice Harlan's view, and now in ours, failure to apply a newly declared 
constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic 
norms of constitutional adjudication. First, it is a settled principle that this 
Court adjudicates only "cases" and "controversies." See U.S. Const., Art. Ill, 
§ 2. Unlike a legislature, we do not promulgate new rules of constitutional 
criminal procedure on a broad basis. Rather, the nature of judicial review 
requires that we adjudicate specific cases, and each case usually becomes the 
vehicle for announcement of a new rule. But after we have decided a new rule 
in the case selected, the integrity of judicial review requires that we apply that 
rule to all similar cases pending on direct review. Justice Harlan observed: 
"If we do not resolve all cases before us on direct review in light 
of our best understanding of governing constitutional principles, 
it is difficult to see why we should so adjudicate any case at 
a l l - In truth, the Court's assertion of power to disregard current 
law in adjudicating cases before us that have not already run the 
full course of appellate review, is quite simply an assertion that 
our constitutional function is not one of adjudication but in 
effect of legislation." Mackev v. United States. 401 U.S., at 679, 
91 S.Ct, at 1173 (opinion concurring in judgment). 
As a practical matter, of course, we cannot hear each case pending on direct 
review and apply the new rule. But we fulfill our judicial responsibility by 
instructing the lower courts to apply the new rule retroactively to cases not yet 
final. Thus, it is the nature of judicial review that precludes us from "[s]imply 
fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for 
pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of 
similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule." Ibid. See 
United States v. Johnson. 457 U.S., at 546-547,555,102 S.Ct., at 2585,2590. 
Second, selective application of new rules violates the principle of treating 
similarly situated defendants the same. See Desist v. United States. 394 U.S., 
at 258-259,89 S.Ct., at 1038-1039 (Harlan, J., dissenting). As we pointed out 
in United States v. Johnson, the problem with not applying new rules to cases 
4 
pending on direct review is "the actual inequity that results when the Court 
chooses which of many similarly situated defendants should be the chance 
beneficiary9' of a new rule. 457 U.S., at 556, n. 16, 102 S.Ct, at 2590, n. 16 
(emphasis in original). Although the Court had tolerated this inequity for a 
time by not applying new rules retroactively to cases on direct review, w e 
noted: "The time for toleration has come to an end." Ibid. 
In United States v. Johnson, our acceptance of Justice Harlan's views led to the 
holding that "subject to [certain exceptions], a decision of this Court 
construing the Fourth Amendment is to be applied retroactively to all 
convictions that were not yet final at the time the decision was rendered " Id., 
at 562,102 S.Ct. at 2593. 
Ibid, 479 U.S. 314, 322-324, 107 S.Ct. 708, 713, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987). The Griffith v. 
Kentucky ckx'i^ iiiiiii ilrinimHcd thai Liu,* (\pc nl ,rohoaclivit> should apply to "to all similar 
cases pending on direct re view. The Griffith v, Kentucky hold uphHil Hy Utah's 
exceptional circumstances rubric and is directly in line with the Utah Legislature's 
declaration and intended use ot the \\**\ * **m ictions Remedy Act 
The State's positi- Jin linK implies m ILJ Sl.ili1 [ticson. ation 
rules should not allow consideration _i -jiamis such as those raised b> Austin herein 
necessarily creates '" the actual inequity that results when the Court chooses which of many 
similarly siliiiili Il iiillln In in ill iiiilll . Jin Hi! IK I In r l i . i m v l i n t i i I n m i y n l .i I U 1 \% mull I i r i l T i t l i 4 7 9 
I J S. at 323, 107 S.Ct. at 713, citing Johnson, 457 U.S., at 556, u. 16, 102 S.Ct, at 2590, n. 
16 (emphasis in original). This Court 's Reyes decision informed Reyes, Cruz and Weaver 
II in inn" holding iii'in iiiid issued in Robertson was Hawed and ifieit'ioa, i l iac vuis I in benefit 
to the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt" and so they coi lid not use that phrase. While 
the determination indirectly affected Reyes, Cruz and Weaver by simply determining their 
lack of entitlement, Austin has been directly affected because the substantial risk this Court 
discovered in Reyes exists in his case because of the use of that phrase. The phrase at issue 
cannot be flawed for Reyes, Cruz and Weaver, but acceptable for Austin under the simple 
doctrine of equity, particularly when this Court determined that the phrase violates Victor 
standards, which are the guidelines to follow after this Court's abandonment of Robertson. 
"The purpose of preservation is to allow the trial court the first chance at hearing 
issues that may have arisen so that the appellate court does not become overwhelmed. "As 
we explained in State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991), the purpose of the 
preservation rule is to ensure that the trial court is first given an opportunity to decide if a 
mistake has been made before appellate review becomes appropriate." State v. Pinder. 2005 
UT 15 , f46,114 P.3d 551. The State attempt to circumnavigate the holdings in Griffith by 
laying claim that a retroactive rule need be preserved under State laws governing 
preservation; however, the State's analysis does not include any authority for this position. 
Regardless, the State's argument fails based on the fact that the retroactive rule circumvents 
the preservation rule by specifically stating that, ". . .failure to apply a newly declared 
constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of 
constitutional adjudication." Griffiths, 479 U.S. at 322,107 S.Ct. at 713. The United States 
Supreme Court also sets forth its authority to dictate such a holding to the State courts by 
stating that,".. .we fulfill our judicial responsibility by instructing the lower courts to apply 
the new rule retroactively to cases not yet final." Id. The United States Supreme Court has 
6 
held that it will not tolerate such an inequity to occur. Id, 479 U.S. at 324,107 S.Ct. at 713. 
of the issue as held by the United State Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States. 520 U.S. 
461,117S.Ct. 1544,1549,137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), that "...where the law at the time of trial 
'plain' at the time of appellate consideration." Id. 
If the exceptional circumstances rubric was not applied to this matter and preservation 
prejudicial to Austin and would leave him without a remedy under which he could receive 
post-conviction relief. In ordinary circumstances, the course of action would be for Austin 
challenge to a conviction or sentence. However, these rules only apply to those whose 
appeals have been exhausted. A change in the law that is of a constitutional nature does not 
fall within the provision-^ Ii"tn1 within Ihr III I' < i" I' Enroll I his leaves Austin with 
only two (2) choices to either file a petition for extraordinary relief under Rule 65c or file 
a writ of habeas corpus. However, neither apply in this matter because Austin has not yet 
exhausted all of his appeal, therefore, he still has an adequate remedy in which to have the 
error in the reasonable doubt jury instruction corrected, a decision by this Court. 
The question of the constitutionality of the reasonable doubt jury instruction that was 
used at Austin's trial falls correctly the Post-Convictions Remedy Act as set forth in 
7 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-35a-104(l)(a). This statute sets forth the grounds upon which an 
individual may file a petition or motion to obtain relief from a judgment that violated the 
United States Constitution or the Utah Constitution. In this matter, the issue caused a 
constitutional violation in that the reasonable doubt jury instruction that was used at Austin's 
trial carried with it a substantial risk that Austin was convicted on a standard that is below 
that of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard that is required by both the federal and state 
constitutions. 
Although Austin's case meets this criteria and he could potentially obtain relief under 
these provisions, UTAH CODE ANN. §§78-35a-102 and -106 precludes him from doing so. 
The Post-Convictions Remedy Act requires exhaustion of all other remedies under §78-3 5a-
102, and specifically requires raising the issues on direct appeal if the conviction is not yet 
final under UTAH CODE ANN. §§78-35a-106. Austin cannot file a petition or motion under 
the Act under UTAH CODE ANN. 78-35a-106(l)(a) because he could have and did raise the 
issue of the reasonable doubt jury instruction on direct appeal after Reyes came down. If 
Austin had not raised the issue on direct appeal, he could not have filed anything under the 
Act under subsection (l)(c) since he would have failed to raise the issue. Basically, the 
reasonable doubt jury instruction issue was properly raised on direct appeal by Austin under 
the Act because he was still able to raise the issue when Reves came down. Because this was 
and is the only way for Austin to raise this issue and because there is no other option to 
remedy the situation, then an exception to the preservation requirement must exist. This 
8 
exception is the application of the exceptional circumstances rubric which has been applied 
between the time of trial and the time of appeal. 
This court cannot affirm the Utah Court of Appeals decision because this would 
possibly n0 t allow Austin to raise "the matter in any form of post-judgment mc I: ion because 
the issue had already been decided by the Utah Court of Appeals. UTAH CODE ANN. 78-35a-
106(l)(b). The Utah Court of Appeals, in essence, did not address this issue and instead 
If this Court determines that the Utah Court of Appeals correctly applied the plain 
error/exceptional circumstances rubric to Austin's case it will have essentially precluded 
that was lower than that of beyond a reasonable doubt, when relief is available to all others 
who had exhausted their appeals before the decision came down in Reyes. Austin would not 
be entitled to the same remedy because he had not exhausted his direct appeal prior to Reyes 
and because the change in the law occurred between the time of trial and the filing of his 
appeal, no retroactivity applies. The entire reason for the exceptional circumstances rubric 
is for the appellate court to apply it in cases like these when there has clearly been a change 
in the law between the time of trial and the time of appeal. Because that is what has 
occurred in this matter, there is no other option than for this Court to find that Hie except i«, i i u I  
circumstances rubric applies. 
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If this Court were to rule that Reyes should be applied retroactively it would open the 
flood gates for anyone who had been convicted under Robertson which was precedent for 
over nine (9) years, to now bring an action to set aside their judgments because Reyes 
overruled Robertson and is being applied retroactively. The State acknowledges this point 
in the Brief of Respondent at p. 8. However, anyone with a case pending on direct review 
when this Court issued its decision in Reyes should be allowed to benefit from the change 
in the law. 
Retroactive application of new laws occurs to protect the rights of those who have 
previously been held to the now-abandoned holdings. In the instant matter, many people 
have been subjected to reasonable-doubt jury instructions under State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 
1219 (Utah 1997) overruled in relevant part by State v.Reves. 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305, 
which led to the substantial risk that they were found guilty based upon a standard that is 
lower than that of "beyond a reasonable doubt." Allowing Reyes to be applied retroactively 
would allow every person ever convicted under a reasonable-doubt jury instruction as set 
forth in Robertson to file post-judgment motions for relief. This would not allow for the 
efficient administration of justice because courts would be inundated with people asking for 
their cases to be reviewed based upon the retroactivity of Reyes. Therefore, this Court 
should decline to address the retroactivity of the holdings in Reyes.. 
The exceptional circumstances rubric should be applied to the instant matter. 
Exceptional circumstances are explained as 'those which would explain and excuse a party's 
10 
App.1990). In State v.Lopez. 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App.1992), the Utah Court of Appeals 
employed the "exceptional circumstances" rubric where a change in law or the settled 
interpretation of law colored the failure to have raised an issue at trial. The issue thus need 
THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY 
In the Brief of Respondent, the State argues that Austin did not preserve the issue of 
Respondent si p. 16. 
"The invited error doctrine prevents a party from inducing action by a court and later 
seeking reversal on the ground that the requested action was error." U.S. v. Edward J.. 224 
F.3d 1216, C.A.10, 2000, citin? United States v. Johnson. 183 F.3d 1175, 1178 n. 2 (10th 
error committed at trial when that parry led the trial court into committing the error." State 
Yj&nfl, 850 P.2d 1201,1220 (Utah 1993). There we explained that this rule, known as the 
that the trial court should have the first opportunity to address the claim of error. Second, it 
discourages parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden 
State v.Dunn 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993). 
11 
"While the invited error doctrine is crafted to " 'discourage [ ] parties from 
intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on 
appeal/ " it is also intended to give the trial court the first opportunity to address the claim 
of error." State v. Geukgeuzian 2004 UT 16 f 12, 86 P.3d 742, quoting State v. Hamilton. 
2003 UT 22,1 54, 70 P.3d 111 {quoting State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 
1996) (further citation omitted). 
The invited error doctrine exists so that a defendant cannot lead a trial court into 
committing an error and then use the error on appeal to have the conviction reversed. 
However, the invited error exists to avoid errors that are intentional, not that a defendant has 
no control over. In the instant matter, Austin did not invite the error. At the time of his trial, 
no error existed and the reasonable-doubt jury instruction requested by trial counsel was the 
one that was correct at the time based upon precedent. An attorney can only rely on current 
case law at the time of trial as nothing else exists on which to base their argument. An 
attorney is not clairvoyant, they cannot determine what a higher court will decide and how 
that may affect their current case and to expect them to do so. As mentioned above and 
detailed further below, this would lead attorneys to raise a long list of useless objections 
opposing circumstances clearly supported by existing precedent. The invited error doctrine 
exists to protect individuals from errors that are intentional at the time of trial, not that are 
out of the control of the defendant. Austin had no control over whether this Court would 
overturn Robertson thereby rendering the reasonable-doubt jury instruction used at his trial 
12 
invite the error 
It is also not possible to invite an error when the State in this matter asked for the 
same instruction. When Austin's counsel asked that the word "obviate* be used in the 
instructions had included the word eliminate. Tr. Vol. II at p. 128. The State commented that 
it also wanted the word eliminated used and did not object to the use of the word "obviate." 
also asked that the same instruction be used. Therefore, no error was invited because no 
error existed at the time oftrial. Ihe error was created between the time of trial and the time 
of Austin's appeal and because a change in the law cm c c i i tired during that time the exceptional 
circumstances rubric or manifest injustice apply in this matter and not the invited error 
doctrine 
This court has previous determined the meaning of manifest injustice, <4we held that 
Min most circumstances the term 'manifest injustice1 is synonymous with the 'plain error* 
s^pis;- - I, 111 
=. .4tc" State v. Casev. 2003 UT 55,140, 82 P.3d 1106, citing Slate v. 7 0 P.2d 
116, 121-22 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989)). Although 
13 
circumstances rubric that applies in this matter because of the change in the law. Therefore, 
the invited error doctrine does not apply in this matter. 
In the Brief of Respondent the state relies on the case of State v. Benny Lopez 886 
P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994) to show that preservation still applies to cases that are pending on 
appeal when a change of law occurs. Brief of Respondent at p. 20. However, the State fails 
to mention that Lopez did not argue exceptional circumstances on his appeal, he presented 
the argument of a liberty interest. Lopez did not argue exceptional circumstances. This 
differentiates his case from the instant matter. In the instant matter, Austin argued 
exceptional circumstances not that a liberty interest was being affected. Therefore, the State 
cannot reply on Lopez in this matter because the principles upon which Lopez based his 
appeal are not the same as they are in the instant matter. 
III. AUSTIN'S TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KNOW 
THAT ROBERTSON WAS VULNERABLE AND MAY BE OVERRULED 
In the Brief of the Respondent the State attempts to argue that no exceptional 
circumstances exist in this matter because trial counsel knew that Robertson may have been 
constitutionally flawed and that Reyes was pending on certiorari. Brief of Respondent at p. 
28. 
In the first State v. Reves. 84 P.3d 841 (Utah App.2004), the State argued that the 
three-part test as set forth by this Court in Robertson was not based on constitutionality and 
this diminished its significance and asked the Court of Appeals to overrule Robertson. The 
Court of Appeals ruled that it did not believe that Robertson was in accordance with the 
14 
precedence set forth in Victor v. Nebraska,. 1239, 127 LJM.2d.583 
the matter for a new trial. Hie State then mcu a r e u i ^ K l ^ ; 'ari that was 
granted on May 26, 2004. 
Although Austin 's 'trial occurred after Certiorari was granted in Reyes. Ausl in' s trial 
value. Had Austin 's trial counsel objected based upon a case that was pending in this court, 
the trial court would not have delayed the decision it made at trial in order to see what the 
at trial it was relying on Robertson because at the time of trial Robertson was the case that 
had precedential value and the issue created b> the Reves decision would 'have been 
of a pending case, this is the reason a person is allowed to take up on appeal an issue that was 
created by a change in the law from the time of trial to the time of appeal, hence exceptional 
i. i i' 1111 is lances >: :e "exceptional circumstances* rubric [may be employed] where a change 
in law or the settled interpretation ol' h v\ < olor| s11 (lie failure h • \u\ r raised an issiu .ii It ", 
State ex rel. T.M.. 2003 U T App 1 9 1 4 1 6 , 73 P. 3d 959. citing State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 .10 
(I Hah Ct.App.19%), I  i do otherwise would create the "virtually useless laundr> lists of 
objections11 .is disrussnl in Johnson v. United States, VMI 11 In I I ih I I ' " I I I "I I, 
1549,137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). Because pending eases have no precedential value, Austin 's 
trial counsel had no duty to know that Robertson was vulnerable and could possibly be 
overturned by this Court, therefore, they had not duty or reason to object to the jury 
instruction at trial. 
IV. THE ROBERTSON TEST DIMINISHED THE STATE'S BURDEN AND 
WAS NOT FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENSE 
In the Brief of Respondent, the State attempts to argue that the three-part test as set 
forth in Robertson raised the State's burden of proof making it more beneficial to Austin than 
harmful. Brief of Respondent at pp. 7-8. 
This is untrue. In this Court's decision in Reyes it discussed how the Robertson test 
and the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt" diminished the state's burden. 
The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is also 
flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree of proof 
necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor standard. The 
"obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step undertaking: the identification 
of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the doubt against the evidence. 
This process suggests a back and forth disputation of a doubt's merits, all to 
the end of determining whether the evidence is sufficient to "obviate" the 
doubt. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not, however, 
condition a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an ability either to 
articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it. An unarticulated conviction that 
the State has failed to meet its burden of proof will serve as a legitimate basis 
to acquit. 
Reyes 2005 UT 33, f27. If a juror had a doubt and could weigh that doubt against the 
evidence to determine if the evidence could extinguish the doubt it would allow the State to 
present evidence of a diminished burden because it would not have to provide proof that met 
the burden of beyond a reasonable doubt. For the State to meet the burden of beyond a 
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reasonable doubt a juror cannot have any doubts that they would weigh against the evidence, 
reasonable doubt. Therefore, Robertson diminished the burden of the State in having to 
~~— -* crime or act occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, it did not raise the burden to the 
based upon a lower standard. 
In the Brief of the Respondent the State also attempts to argue that Robertson is more 
U I133, f 30, pointed out, using the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt'1' carried with it the 
substantial risk that a juror could convict someone based upon a standard that was lower than 
lliijl ol beyond a reasonable doi ill: il: Creating a substantial risk that an accused could be 
defense favorable because this could allow an accused to be convicted based upon a lower 
standard. I herefore, Robertson was not defense favorable and Austin ran the risk that he was 
V. EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT ENCOMPASS THE PLAIN 
ERROR STANDARD 
In the Brief of the Respondent the State attempts to argue that if this Court, finds that 
exceptionalciru"'»iMain/es apply (kti Iy - •»I f•»- llvi v |" iiij>;\ f plum mor ,1b1 yy\\ i|,l||l|,n/ 
of Respondent at p. 8, 31. By making this argument the State is attempting to change the 
exceptional circumstances rubric as it applies in Ulitli 
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Plain error and exceptional circumstances cannot exist together. "Unlike "plain 
error," "exceptional circumstances" is not so much a precise doctrine, which may be analyzed 
in terms of fixed elements, as it is a descriptive term used to memorialize an appellate court's 
judgment that even though an issue was not raised below and even though the plain error 
doctrine does not apply, unique procedural circumstances nonetheless permit consideration 
of the merits of the issue on appeal." State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 8, (Utah App.,1996) 
(emphasis added). Exceptional circumstances is what is applied when the prongs of the plain 
error doctrine cannot be met, yet an error still exists, therefore, they cannot exist as one and 
the same. 
"In general, to establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from 
an alleged error that was not properly objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i) 
An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error 
is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome 
for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined." State 
v.Dunn 850 P.2d 120lOJtah. 1993V see State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116,122 (Utah 1989); State 
v. Bell. 770 P.2d 100, 105-06 (Utah 1988); State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 
1987V State v.Fontana. 680P.2d 1042,1048 (Utah 1984);^ea/5oElc!redge,773P.2dat35-
36;cf. UTAHRJEVID. 103(d); UTAHRXRIM.P. 19(C). If any one of these requirements is not 
met, plain error is not established. Cf. State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992); 
Verde. 770 P.2d at 123. The State concedes that the second prong of the plain error doctrine 
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cannot be met because the error was not obvious to the trial court. Brief of Respondent at p. 
31. Because the second prong requires that an error be obvious to the trial court it can never 
be met in circumstances were there has been a substantial change in the law between the time 
of trial and the time of appeal because at the time of trial there was no error, making these 
circumstances exceptional. The State contends that the first and third prong of the plain error 
doctrine can still be met, however, as stated above in, if all three prongs of the plain error 
doctrine are not met, plain error has not been established. Not only can the second prong not 
be met but neither can the first and third prong of the plain error doctrine. The first prong 
requires that an error exist at the time of trial, however, no error existed in this matter at the 
time of trial, it was not until the change in the law under Reves that the error was came into 
existence. The third prong can also not be met because the harm in this matter is the 
substantial risk that was created by using the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt" and it is 
impossible to see what the potential effects of this phrase were on the juror's minds. 
Therefore, none of the three prongs of the plain error doctrine are met in this matter so 
exceptional circumstances is the only rubric that can apply. 
The Utah Court of Appeals applied the Utah plain error doctrine when it rendered its 
decision in this matter, when it is the federal plain error standard on appeal as set forth in 
Johnson v. United States. 520 U.S. 461,117 S.Ct. 1544,1549,137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), that 
should have been applied to the instant matter. In Johnson, the United States Supreme Court 
stated, that "...where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law 
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at the time of appeal—it is enough that an error be 'plain' at the time of appellate 
consideration." Id. The use of the word "plain" in Johnson does not require an undertaking 
of Utah's three-prong plain error doctrine. Instead determining what plain error may exist 
at the time of appeal requires a two-step undertaking. First, did the law change and second 
did the change in the law create an error. The second prong in Johnson only requires that an 
error was created based upon a change in the law at the time of appeal, not at the time of trial. 
Harm does not have to be established as that is best left to be determined by an ultimate 
decision on the merits of the issue. Because the reasonable doubt jury instruction standard 
changed between the time of Austin's trial and the time he filed his appeal and because the 
change in that law created an error, this error should be reviewed under the Utah's 
exceptional circumstances rubric and the test as set forth in Johnson. Because the three 
prongs of Utah's plain error doctrine have not been met, plain error does not exist. 
VI. HARM IS NOT NECESSARY TO REVIEW THE ERROR 
In the Brief of the Respondent the State argues that if this court determines that 
exceptional circumstances apply to this matter, that the third prong of the plain error test, 
harm, also applies and that Austin has not shown how he was harmed in this matter. Brief 
ofRespondent at p. 8. The harm in this matter is the use of the phrase "obviate all reasonable 
doubt" and the substantial risk it carried that a jury would convict Austin based upon a 
standard of that which is below a reasonable doubt. The risk is the harm because no one 
knows what was in the jury's mind or how they may have interpreted or come to a conclusion 
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of the evidence based upon the reasonable doubt jury instruction given at trial. No one 
knows if a jury tried to weigh doubt against the evidence to overcome a doubt or if they were 
really convinced that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Austin committed 
the crime. The United States Constitution supports the idea that a guilty man should go free 
if there exists any doubt instead of an innocent man being punished. Therefore, it is best to 
err on the side of caution and hold that if a jury instruction carries any form of a substantial 
risk that the instruction does not belong in the courtroom. Because the phrase "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" carried with it a substantial risk (harm) that Austin was convicted based 
upon a standard of below a reasonable doubt, no harm needs to be shown because the risk 
existed in the use of that very phrase. 
VII. REYES COMPLETELY OVERRULED ROBERTSON 
In the Brief of Respondent, the State attempts to argue that this Court's ruling in Reyes 
only overturned the Robertson test and not the jury instruction as set forth in Robertson. 
Brief of Respondent at p. 8. 
At the time of the decision in Robertson, the jury instruction given was okay because 
it conveyed the message of "obviate all reasonable doubt" to the jury even though it did not 
use that phrase. "Obviate all reasonable doubt" was not required to be used as a phrase in 
reasonable doubt jury instructions until after Robertson had been decided so the jury 
instruction used at Robertson's trial was not required to contain that language. This Court's 
decision in Reyes overturned the three-prong test portion of Robertson because it contained 
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the phrase and the requirement of the three-prong test. However, the decision in Reyes could 
not say that the instruction as a whole in Robertson should be overturned and remanded for 
a new trial since the instruction in Robertson was not before the court. The decision in Reyes 
could only correct the error in the law that was created based upon the decision in Robertson 
and brought before the court in Reyes. The court could not hear anything that was at issue 
in Robertson when it determined Reyes because Robertson9 s issues were not before the court. 
Although Robertson's jury instruction conveyed the same message as the phrase 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" without using the phrase, it was correct for his instruction to 
do so at the time of his appeal. This Court cannot go back sua sponte and give Robertson a 
new trial based on his instruction. Reyes was not asking to use Robertson's instruction in his 
matter he was only asking for the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt" to be used at his trial 
because the first prong of the test in Robertson indicated that this phrase needed to be used. 
The State's argument that Reyes did not overturn Robertson's instruction and therefore his 
reasonable doubt jury instruction is sound makes it appear as though every reasonable doubt 
jury instruction that has ever been upheld by an appellate court is a sound instruction because 
they were not specifically addressed by Reyes. Reyes completely overturned Robertson even 
though it did not specifically address his reasonable doubt jury instruction, which at the time 
of his appeal and trial was correct under current law. If Robertson felt like his instruction 
was incorrect, then it is his duty to bring that issue before the court, not for this Court to 
address that issue in Reyes. 
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VIII. NO ARGUMENT NEED BE ARTICULATED TO CREATE THE 
SUBSTANTIAL RISK...IT IS INHERENT IN THE USE OF THE PHRASE 
In the Brief of Respondent the state attempts to argue that "the prosecutors did not 
argue that a reasonable doubt must be defined before it could serve as a basis for an 
acquittal." Brief of Respondent at p. 8. The State also cites to the language included in 
Reyes by this Court that states, "to the extent that the Robertson obviate test would permit 
the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test works 
to improperly diminish the State's burden." Reyes at 128. Brief of Respondent at p. 11. 
In the instant matter, although the State did not argue that it need only obviate doubts 
that were sufficiently defined the language "the State must obviate all reasonable doubt" was 
in the jury instruction and this permitted the State to do so if they decided to. Because this 
Court in Reyes determined that the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt" created a 
substantial risk the State did not have to make the argument that they need only obviate 
doubts that were sufficiently defined because the "obviate all reasonable doubt" phase 
permitted them to do so. Because Robertson permitted the State to make this argument, this 
Court overturned Robertson. Therefore, the State did not need to make the argument that the 
jury obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, because the phrase "obviate all reasonable 
doubt" in the jury instruction created the risk that they could do just that. The risk in this 
matter exists in the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt", and simply by the use of this 
phrase the State was permitted to make that argument even though they did not. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Austin respectfully requests that this Court reverse die 
decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter for a new trial. 
DATED this f C ^ day of February, 2007. 
William L-Schultz J 
Attorney for Graham Austin 
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